We consider small-influence aggregative games with a large number of players n. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria in O(n log n) steps (in at most cn log n steps for some constant c > 0). Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit frequency that is exponentially close to 1 (frequency of at least 1 − e −c n for some constant c > 0).
Introduction
Consider, as a motivating example, a Cournot oligopoly with a large number of firms n. The static notion of equilibrium requires very strong informational assumptions. Namely, in order to compute equilibrium, every firm should know the production cost function of all opponents. Those assumptions may be unrealistic in several circumstances, mainly when the number of firms is large. This motivates the study of equilibria in a dynamical perspective.
Two natural questions arise in this framework. First, are the equilibria in fact limit points of some simple adaptive dynamic that evolves over time? If the 1 Center for the Mathematics of Information, Department of Computing and Mathematical Sciences, California Institute of Technology. E-mail:babich@caltech.edu. 2 The author gratefully acknowledges support from Walter S. Baer and Jeri Weiss fellowship.
answer to this first question is positive, then the second natural question will be: How fast does this dynamic reaches those equilibria?
Consider the following natural best-reply dynamic. In every step t a single firm i is chosen uniformly at random. In step t + 1, firm i updates its amount of production to the one that maximizes its profit with respect to opponent's production at step t (in other words, the firm updates her action to the best reply), whereas all the other firms make no change. 3 Will this procedure eventually lead to equilibrium? A very elegant approach to dealing with this question was presented by Monderer and Shapley [16] . They proved that in the case where the cost function of every firm is linear, the Cournot oligopoly is a potential game. Therefore along every improving path the potential function is monotonically increasing, and it must end up on a local maximum of the potential function, which is a pure Nash equilibrium of the game. There have been quite a few generalizations of Monderer and Shapley's result, e.g., Kukushkin [14] [15], Dubey et al. [9] , Dinodos and Mazzetti [8] , and Jensen [13] . This literature shows that under weaker conditions (not necessarily linear production functions) a Cournot oligopoly is a pseudo-potential game, i.e., a game with no best-reply cycles; this notion is also called a finite improvement path property.
Clearly, absence of best-reply cycles is a sufficient condition for the convergence of the best-reply dynamic to a pure Nash equilibrium.
There are two shortcomings in this literature. First, all the above papers make strong additional assumptions on the payoff functions of the players in the form of monotonicity of the best-reply correspondence (strategic complements or strategic substitutes: [14] , [15] , and [13] ) or in the form of concavity [8] .
Second, none of these papers addresses the question, how fast does the bestreply dynamic converge to an equilibrium? The second question is a central one: by a result of Hart and Mansour [12] , it may take exp(n) steps to reach an equilibrium, even in pseudo-potential games. 4 In such a case, if the number of firms is large, then the market will essentially never reach an equilibrium.
In this paper we overcome these two issues. Regarding the first issue, we make no monotonicity assumption, no concavity assumption, and even no continuity of the production function assumption. Instead, we analyze the general class of aggregative games. Aggregative games, first introduced by Selten [18] , are games where the payoff functions of every player depends on his action and the sum of actions of all players (Cournot oligopoly is clearly an aggregative game because the revenue of each firm is a function of the total production).
We make an additional assumption of small influence; i.e., player has small influence on opponents' payoffs. 5 In the Cournot oligopoly case the small influence assumption is translated to the assumption that each firm has small influence on the total production, because small influence on the total production, yields small influence on the price, which yields small influence on the revenue of the other firms. The analysis of the general class of aggregative-games, suggests that in Cournot oligopolies convergence to equilibrium occurs not because of the particular economical structure of the payoff functions (strategic complements, strategic substitutes, or concavity) but because of the fact that all the payoffs depend on a single relevant parameter, which is the total production.
Regarding the second issue, the main focus of this paper is on analyzing how fast the best-reply dynamic converges to an equilibrium. We present a version of the best-reply dynamic which convergences fast to approximate equilibrium, namely in O(n log n) steps (see Theorem 1). In the Cournot oligopoly case, this mean that every firm should make in expectation O(log n) updates of the production in order for the market to reach an approximate pure Nash equilibrium.
The approach in this paper differs from the literature above ( [16] , [14] , [15] , [9] , [8] , and [13] ) in the following respects. First, we will not try to achieve absence of best-reply cycles; in our class of games best-reply cycles might exist.
to find an equilibrium not only for the best-reply dynamic but for any dynamic that satisfies the natural assumption of uncoupledness. 5 In Comment 2 Section 4 we show that the small influence assumption is necessary.
Instead, we will rely on the fact that the updating player is chosen uniformly at random. This is enough to show that although cycles might exist, the dynamic does not follow cycles that do not contain approximate equilibria for a long time.
Second, we will not try to achieve convergence to an absorbing state of a pure Nash equilibrium. In our class of games absorbing states need not exist, and the best-reply dynamic may continue to change forever. On the other hand, we show in Theorem 2 that most of the time the played action forms a pure Nash approximate equilibrium.
This paper generalizes the results of Babichenko [5] . In [5] binary-action anonymous games are considered. This class of games is equivalent to aggregative games where every player has the two actions {0, 1} (see Comment 1 in Section 4). If we try to prove similar convergence results for aggregative games with three actions, the techniques in [5] fail to work for this case. The arguments in [5] are significantly based on the assumption that each player has exactly the two actions {0, 1}. In the present paper we modify the techniques from [5] , these modifications allow us to prove convergence results for the general case where every player has a continuum of actions. 6 This contribution is significant because it allows us to apply the convergence result for aggregative games with economical interest as Cournot oligopoly, contribution-games, minimal effort games, and diamond's search game (see [1] for a discussion of these examples).
One of the key ideas that allows us to generalize the convergence results from the two-action case to the general case of continuum of actions is Proposition 2 which provides a nice generalization to the Ballot problem, and may be of independent interest. To the best of my knowledge, such a generalization of the Ballot problem does not appear in the literature.
Perhaps because fast convergence in large games is a relatively new topic, 6 Although the discussed class of games has a continuum of actions for each player, by Comment 4 Section 4, in our version of the best-reply dynamic each player uses only a finite number of actions. Therefore, we emphasize that the main technical and conceptual contribution of the present paper, relative to the existing result of [5] is not the jump from finite number of actions to a continuum of actions, but the jump from the two-action case to any finite number of actions case.
it has gotten little attention in the literature. The central negative result by Hart and Mansour [12] shows that for every uncoupled dynamic that leads to a pure Nash equilibrium (i.e., a dynamic where the strategy of every player does not depend on the payoff functions of the other players), there exists an n-player game where it will take exponential in n number of periods to reach an equilibrium. Fast convergence has also been studied in various interesting subclasses of games, such as potential games by Awerbuch et al. [3] , binary anonymous games by Babichenko [5] , and weakly acyclic population games by Arieli and Young [2] .
Cournot oligopoly games were studied in an evolutionary dynamics framework by Schaffer [17] for the duopoly case, and by Vega-Redondo [21] for the general oligopoly case. Alos-Ferrer and Ania [1] consider general aggregative games in the evolutionary framework. Our notion of "stability" of approximate Nash equilibria (see Definition 1 and Figure 1 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section 2.1 we present the class of aggregative games, and we prove that if every player has small influence on the other player's payoff, then such games possess a pure Nash approximate equilibrium. In Section 2.2 we present the version of the bestreply dynamic that will be considered in this paper. Section 2.3 contains the main theorems. In Section 2.4 we sketch the proofs of the theorems. In Section 3 we present several probability inequalities for sampling without replacement.
Those inequalities play a central role in the formal proofs of the theorems, which are relegated to the Appendix.
The Model

Aggregative games with small influence
In aggregative games, the actions of each player are numbers in R, and the payoff of each player depends on his own action and on the sum of actions of all players. Equivalently, we can say that the payoff of each player depends on his own action and on the average of actions of all players. For convenience, we will use the second representation of aggregative games.
i . Note that 0-best-react (exact best-react) might not exist, because we did not assume continuity of v i in the a i coordinate. However, ε-best-react is guaranteed to exist for every ε > 0. We define an ε-best-react mapping of player Remark 1. Best-reply refers to a profile of the opponent, whereas best-react refers to an average-action value. Given a profile a, note that b i ε (f (a)) is not an ε-best-reply to a −i , because the change in a i results in a change in the aggregated value f (a). However, by Lemma 1, b i ε (f (a)) is a (3λ/n + ε)-best-reply to a −i , because the change in the aggregated value f will be at most 1/n. Alos-Ferrer and Ania [1] noticed that this simplification of the best-reply correspondence to the best-react correspondence may simplify the analysis of large aggregative games.
Proof. For every action a i ∈ A i we get
which completes the proof.
Since we do not assume continuity, aggregative games need not have Nash equilibrium (niter pure nor mixed) 9 ; nevertheless, the following proposition shows that those games possess an approximate pure Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1.
In every λ-Lipschitz aggregative game there exists a pure Nash (4λ/n)-equilibrium.
The proof uses similar ideas to those that prove the existence of an approximate pure Nash equilibrium in large anonymous games; see, e.g., Azrieli and
9 Even of the case of single-player with the payoff function
that is independent of the aggregated value, the game has no Nash equilibrium.
Shmaya [4] or Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [7] . Actually, Azrieli and Shmaya [4] prove much more general result that every finite game with small influence has an approximate pure Nash equilibrium. We cannot imply this result here directly because we consider a continuum of actions for each player.
Proof. Fix ε = λ/n and fix some ε-best-react correspondence b
Simply speaking, φ(x) is the resulted average-action value if all players ε-bestreacting to x. Consider two close points x and x such that 0 ≤ x − x ≤ 1/n, φ(x) ≥ x and φ(x) ≤ x. Such two points exist by the intermediate value theorem implied on the function φ, where φ is the linear interpolation of the discrete points {(x, φ(x)) : x = m/n where m = 0, 1, ..., n}.
Consider the sequence
.., n. We know that s 0 ≥ x and s n ≤ x ≤ x+1/n. We know also that |s k+1 − s k | ≤ 1/n. Therefore, there must be an index k * where
) every player λ/n-best-reacting to one of the values x or x, whereas the real average-action value is s k * , where
Actually, the same argument could be applied to prove existence of pure Nash approximate equilibrium in the more general class of small influence quasiaggregative games, where the aggregating function need not be the sum of the actions, but any arbitrary function that aggregates every action profile a, to a single relevant number r, such that the payoff of every player i is a function of his own action and r (rather than the whole action profile a). See [13] for the definition and a discussion on quasi-aggregative games.
Best-reply dynamic
Henceforth, we fix ε and we will refer to ε as a constant. In addition, we fix some ε-best-react correspondence b i ε . After we fixed b i ε , we will refer to b i ε (x) as the best-react to x, and we will have in mind that actually b i ε (x) might be only ε-best-react. The assumption that b i ε (x) is only ε-best-react and not exact, is needed only for the purpose of the mapping b i to be well defined. Alternatively, one could assume continuity of v i (·, x) with respect to the first coordinate, and then we can define b i to be the exact best-react.
We would like to consider the case where a single player is chosen at random at each step, and he updates his action according to the best-reply to a −i or according to the best-react to f (a). Unfortunately, those dynamics seem to be very hard to analyze because every small change in the aggregated value may cause a significant change in the best-reply (or best-react) action of all players.
Similar to [5] , we overcome this problem by assuming that the players do not best-react to the exact aggregated value f (a), but best-react to an ε-floor value of it; i.e., every player i observes the aggregated value f (a) ε := max{kε :
kε < f (a) and k ∈ N} and updates his action to b
. This assumption is reasonable, because in large games, though it may be unfeasible to calculate the exact value f (a), it may be feasible to observe an approximate value of it.
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This assumption will allow us to analyze the behavior of the best-reply dynamic over segments [kε, (k + 1)ε) where the best-reacts of all players remain constant, and then to deduce results on the general behavior of the best-reply dynamic.
Formally, the dynamic BR * (ε) is defined as follows. The initial state of the dynamic is an arbitrary action profile a(0). At each time t a single player i is chosen at random uniformly; this player i updates his action to a
. The other players continue to play the same action, i.e., a −i (t+1) = a −i (t). In the case where the chosen player i is already best-reacting
there will be no change in the played action. Therefore, it will be more convenient to consider the dynamic BR(ε) where the chosen player i is always among the set of non-best-reacting players {j :
The only difference between the dynamics BR * (ε) and BR(ε) is the speed of change. The maximal ratio between their speed of change of is 1/n. This ratio is obtained in the extreme situation where there exists exactly one non-best-reacting player. In the paper we will discuss the dynamic BR(ε). However, by the above argument, every result on BR(ε) induces a result on BR * (ε).
Main theorems
The first theorem asserts that for every aggregative game the BR(ε) dynamic reaches a pure Nash approximate equilibrium in O(n log n) steps in expectation.
Theorem 1. For every ε > 0 there exists n 0 (ε) such that for every λ > 0, every λ-Lipschitz n-person aggregative game with n ≥ n 0 (ε), and every initial state a(0), the expected number of steps before the BR(ε) dynamic reaches the set of pure Nash ((5λ + 1)ε)-equilibria is at most 11 n(5 ln n + 5/ε 2 ) = O(n log n).
Note that Theorem 1 implies that the rate of convergence does not depend on the Lipschitz constant of the game λ. The approximation accuracy of the Nash equilibrium is the one that depends on λ.
The second theorem asserts that for every aggregative game, these approximate equilibria are played by the BR(ε) dynamic with a limit frequency that is exponentially close to 1.
Theorem 2. For every ε > 0 there exists n 0 (ε) and a constant c = c(ε) > 0 (independent of n) such that for every λ > 0, every λ-Lipschitz n-person aggregative game with n ≥ n 0 (ε), and every initial state a(0), the limit frequency of steps where the played action profile by the BR(ε) dynamic is a pure Nash ((5λ + 1)ε)-equilibria is at least 12 1 − e −cn .
Sketch of the proof
The formal proof appears in the Appendix. Here we provide an informal sketch of the main ideas in the proof.
The basic idea is to relate the behavior of the aggregated value µ with the function φ, which is defined in (1) . Assume that at time t the aggregated value is x = µ(a(t)). If the chosen player at time t is player i, then the change in the aggregated value will be
The intuition is that if φ(x) > x, then "it is more likely that µ will increase" because we sample a number at random among numbers with a positive sum. On the other hand, if φ(x) < x, then "more probably µ will decrease."
Note that φ is constant over the segments of the form [kε, (k + 1)ε) for k = 0, 1, ..., 1/ε ; denote those segments by σ k . In order to convert the above intuition into a formal statement we use the following remark.
Remark 2. Once a player has updated his action according to his best-react he will not be chosen again as long as the aggregation µ(a(t)) stays in the same segment σ k (because he is already best-reacting). Therefore the behavior of BR(ε) in a segment σ k depends on the order in which the players are chosen to update their actions, when the choice is done without replacement. values the probability of crossing such a segment from left to right is high (constant independent of n), whereas the probability of crossing such a segment from right to left is small (exponentially small in n). Lemmas 4 and 6 draw the symmetric picture for the case where φ has low values (see Figure 1 ).
In Proposition 3 we use these results to prove that µ reaches a stable value fast (see Definition 1 and Figure 1 ). For every stable value v the probability that µ will move far from v is exponentially small.
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on the following idea. Assume that BR(ε)
reached a stable value v (by Proposition 3 it happens fast). If all players are chosen to update their action during the period of time when µ stays close to v, then the played action will be an approximate pure Nash equilibrium. This is because every player is best-reacting to an aggregated value that is close to v, whereas the real aggregated value is also close to v. By Lemma 1 this is enough to ensure that all players are approximately best-replying. By the classical Coupon-Collector problem (see [10] ) the expected time to choose all players is O(n log n) whereas the expected time to move far from v is exponential in n.
Therefore, with high probability all players are chosen before the aggregation µ goes far from v.
Finally, the proof of Theorem 2 is based on a simple arrival-time analysis.
The expected time to reach the set of approximate Nash equilibria (P N E (5λ+1)ε )
is O(n log n), whereas the expected time to leave P N E (5λ+1)ε is exponential in n (in order to leave P N E (5λ+1)ε the aggregated value µ must move far from v).
Sum Inequalities for Sampling without Replacement
Consider the probability space Γ = Γ({d i } m i=1 ), where the numbers d i are sampled without replacement; i.e., the sampling order is
where π is a uniformly random permutation over {1, 2, ..., m}. We denote by
the random variable of the sum of the first k sampled numbers. We would like to analyze the probability of the event ω := {s k ≥ 0 ∀k = 1, 2, ..., m}.
The classical Ballot (see [10] ) asks the following question. In an election where two candidates A and B received v votes each, what is the probability that candidate B will never be ahead of candidate A throughout the count, if the count is done uniformly at random? This question corresponds in our The proof uses similar ideas to those presented in Takacs [20] . , let j ∈ arg min k s k be an index where the sum reaches its minimal value. Then o j is a good order, because the summation starts from the minimal value.
Therefore, among the m orders o l there exists at least one good order (o j ).
(b) We adopt the proof of (a), and we notice that j∈B d j = 0. Therefore, there exists exactly one index j ∈ arg min k s k . Therefore, among the m orders o l there exists exactly one good order (o j ).
(c) We again adopt the proof of (a). Without loss of generality we assume that j = 0. We define the following recursive sequence of indexes:
An example of sequence s k and the corresponding sequence j(r) is presented in Figure 2 . The elements of the sequence j(r) are marked by black dots.
If we start the summation at j(r), then for indexes k ≥ j(r) we have
For indexes k < j(r) we have m i=j(r)
where we use the fact that s k ≥ 0. Therefore o j(r) is a good order for j(r) < t. Now the question is, how many indexes j(r) do we have? We know that s j(r+1) = min k>j(r) s k ≤ s j(r)+1 ≤ s j(r) + c. Therefore s j(r+1) −s j(r) ≤ c. The sequence {s j(r) } r is a monotonically increasing sequence that starts from 0 (for r = 1) and essentially reaches s j(r) = s (for j(r) = m). The distance of two adjacent elements in the sequence is at most c; therefore, there must be at least s/c elements.
Thus we have proved that among the orders o 1 , o 2 , ..., o m there must be at least s/c orders which are good.
The following lemma claims that the sum reaches values that are significantly larger than b with exponentially small probability.
Lemma 2. If s ≥ 0, |d i | < c and α > 1 then
Proof. The proof uses an exponential inequality derived by Serfling [19] for the case of sampling without replacement. First let us note that it must take at least αs/c steps to reach αs from s 0 = 0. Similarly, it takes at least (α − 1)s/c steps to decrease s k from αs to s m = s. Therefore the inequality s k ≥ αs is possible only for αs/c ≤ k ≤ m − (α − 1)s/c. Therefore,
By Serfling [19] , Corrolary 1.1 we have 
The necessity of the small-influence condition. If we allow
to be not Lipschitz in x, then we can consider the minority game with an odd number of players n = 2m − 1. More precisely, every player has two actions and his payoff is 1 if the number of players that choose his action is below m, otherwise his payoff is 0. It is easy to see that this game has no approximate pure Nash equilibrium. This is a binary anonymous game, and by Comment 1 it is an aggregative game. But it does not have the small influence property:
the change of action of a single player may affect by 1 the payoff of the other players. Therefore, the assumption of small influence is crucial for the existence of a pure profile that is an approximate equilibrium, and so small influence is crucial for the convergence of the best-reply dynamic to equilibrium. (b) Geometric aggregation. In effort games, for example, it might be reasonable to assume that the success of the project depends on the multiplication of efforts Π i a i rather than their sum. In such a case it is reasonable to consider games where the aggregating function is f (a) = Π i a i = exp( i ln a i ). If we take h i (a i ) = ln a i , then by the above remark these game can also be presented as aggregative game. Note that the constructed game is a small influence game only if the action sets A i are bounded away from 0; i.e., there exists a constant δ such that a i ≥ δ for every i and every a i ∈ A i . In such a case, the game is equivalent to a small influence aggregative game, and therefore the convergence results of Theorems 1 and 2 holds for this class of games too.
Appendix: Proof of the Main Theorems
Notations
We will use the following standard notations. We will write
if there exists n 0 and a constant c > 0 such that h 1 (n) ≤ ch 2 (n) for every n > n 0 , and we will write h 1 (n) ≥ Ω(h 2 (n)) if there exists n 0 and constant c > 0 such that h 1 (n) ≥ ch 2 (n) for every n > n 0 . In the statement of the propositions and lemmas we will specify those c and n 0 , but in the proofs we will skip those simple computations. I am sure that the presented constants c and n 0 can be significantly improved. Note that we refer to ε as a fixed number; therefore c could depend on ε.
For a Markov chain M over a finite state space S with realization denoted by (a(0), a(1), ...), we will denote by P M the probability measure of M . Thus P M (a → C) denotes the transition probability (in a single step) from a ∈ S to the set of states C ⊂ S. For B ⊂ S we will say that
Given an initial state a(0) ∈ S and C ⊂ S, we define the stopping time τ = τ (a(0), C) = inf{t : a(t) ∈ C}, and we denote by
the expected number of steps for reaching C from the initial state a(0). Given B ⊂ S we denote by
the maximal expected time for reaching C from B. In the case where B = S we will write T M (C) := T M (S C) for short.
We recall that σ k = [kε, (k + 1)ε) are the segments where φ is constant.
Denote by l k = [kε, kε + 1/n) the extreme left segment of σ k (of size 1/n) and by r k := [(k + 1)ε − 1/n, (k + 1)ε) the extreme right segment of σ k . The corresponding subsets of A will be denoted by L k = {a ∈ A : µ(a) ∈ l k } and
} denotes the set of action profiles where all the players are best-reacting (this set may be empty). The center of σ k will be denoted by c k := (k + 1/2)ε.
The Markov chain M 1 induced by the stopping time t m
We would like to analyze the transition probabilities from aggregation µ ∈ r k to aggregations µ ∈ l k or µ ∈ l k+1 , and from l k to r k−1 or r k . Note that we defined the size of the segments r k and l k in such a way that the aggregation cannot "skip over" those segments without visiting them. We define the following sequence of stopping times:
If a(t m ) ∈ EQ, then t m+1 = t m + 1.
Lemmas 3 and 4 claim that with high probability (Ω(1)) the aggregation will cross a segment in the correct direction.
Lemmas 5 and 6 claim that with an exponentially (in n) small probability the aggregation will cross a segment in the incorrect direction.
Lemma 5. There exists n 0 (ε) such that for every
Lemma 6. There exists n 0 (ε) such that for every n ≥ n 0 if φ(c k ) ≤ c k , then
The proofs of Lemmas 6 and 4 are similar to the proofs of Lemmas 3 and 5;
therefore we will present only the proofs of Lemmas 3 and 5.
Before we prove the lemmas, an important remark that will be useful during the proof is in order.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let a(t m ) ∈ L k be the initial state, and denote d i = (br i (a(t m ))− a i (t m ))/n, which represents the influence of player i on the aggregation once he is chosen to update his action in the segment σ k . Then
By Remark 2 the numbers {d i : d i = 0} will be sampled without replacement as far as µ(a(t)) ∈ σ k . Note that if during all the sampling k i=i d i ≥ 0, then µ(a(t)) never goes below the value µ(a(t m )), and so it cannot reach the segment r k−1 . Therefore,
The probability space Γ and the random variables s k are defined in Section 3.
Denote m = |{i : d i = 0}|. We know that d i ≤ 1/n for all i and by inequality (2) i d i ≥ ε/2 − 1/n. Therefore, by Proposition 2(c),
Proof of Lemma 5. Let a(t m ) ∈ L k be the initial state, and let
Note that if µ(a(t)) reaches r k , then i d i exceeds ε − 2/n. Therefore,
Note also that
because an insertion of numbers d i = 0 into the sampling pool does not change the probability of the event "there exists k s.t. s k ≥ ε − 2/n." By Lemma 2 we have
The next two subsections (5.3 and 5.4) are the same as the parallel parts in the proof of [5] (Sections 5.4 and 5.5 in [5] ). For the sake of completeness we present those parts of the proof here.
The Markov chain M 2 induced by the stopping time t 2m
Consider the sub-sequence {a(t 2m )} ∞ m=1 , which is also a Markov chain, denoted by M 2 . Every single step of BR(ε) (i.e., {a(t)} ∞ t=1 ) will be called a step, and every single step of M 2 (i.e., {a(t 2m )} ∞ m=1 ) will be called a period. Remark 3. Note that t m+1 − t m ≤ n, because a player cannot be chosen twice in the same segment; therefore, after n steps, either BR(ε) switches to a new segment or BR(ε) reaches EQ. Therefore t 2m+2 − t 2m ≤ 2n, which means that every period is at most 2n steps.
Since the sequence a(t m ) switches every time between R ∪ EQ and L ∪ EQ, it follows that a(t 2m ) ∈ R ∪ EQ for every m or a(t 2m ) ∈ L ∪ EQ for every m.
Without loss of generality we assume that a(t 2m ) ∈ L ∪ EQ.
To deal with the extreme segments σ 0 and σ 1/ε in the same way as we do with the other segments, we put φ(c −1 ) ≥ c −1 and φ(c 1/ε +1 ) ≤ c 1/ε +1 .
Using Lemmas 3, 4, 5, and 6, we can deduce the following bounds on the transition probabilities of M 2 :
If
If φ(c k−1 ) ≥ c k−1 and φ(c k ) ≤ c k (i.e., l k is a stable aggregation), then It is easy to show that the inequalities hold also for the extreme segments σ 0 and σ 1/ε .
Inequality (7) shows that once M 2 reaches an aggregation l k such that φ(c k−1 ) ≥ c k−1 and φ(c k ) ≤ c k , then it will stay there for a long time because the probability of leaving l k is exponentially small. This leads us to the following definition:
An example of a function φ and the derived inequalities is presented in Figure   3 . The following proposition claims that the expected number of periods required to reach L * is constant (independent of n):
The proposition implies the following corollary using Remark 3.
In the proof of Proposition 3 we use Proposition A.3 of Gorodeisky [11] which exactly suits to our situation. The proposition claims the following: Proposition 4 (Gorodeisky [11] ). Given a Markov chain M over S, let S 0 , S 1 , ..., S m be piece-wise disjoint sets such that
Proof of Proposition 3. For every k = 0, 1, ..., 1/ε we define the distance d(k) of l k from l * as follows: 18 i.e., the distance from the closest stable aggregation on the left side of l k . 17 The proof of the proposition yields, for instance, that n 0 = 210/ε 3.75 and O(1) = 4.1 ε 2 are sufficient. 18 Note that −1 ∈ {k ≤ k : l k ∈ l * } = ∅; therefore the distance is well defined.
•
i.e., the distance from the closest stable aggregation on the left side of l k .
• d r (k)); i.e., the maximal distance between the left side and the right side.
In the example presented in Figure 3 the distances are
Now we define sets of states S j = {L k : d(k) = j} for j = 1, 2, ..., 1/ε , and S 0 = L * ∪ EQ. By inequalities (4), (5), and (6) we get that P M2 (S j → S j−1 ∪EQ) ≥ Ω(1), and
Proof of the main theorems
Proof of Theorem 1. Instead of proving that BR(ε) reaches the set P N E (5λ+1)ε fast, we will prove the slightly stronger result that BR(ε) reaches the set P N E (5λ+1)ε ∩ (L * ∪ EQ) fast. This strengthening will be useful in the proof of Theorem 2.
Consider a stable proportion l k ∈ l * . Inequality (7) tells us that once the dynamic BR(ε) reaches an aggregated value µ(a(t)) ∈ l k , then the aggregated value will stay for a long time in the segments σ k−1 ∪ σ k . Consider the scenario where all the players are chosen to update their action during the period of time when the aggregation stays in σ k−1 ∪ σ k . In such a case BR(ε) reaches a pure Nash (4λε + λ/n + ε)-equilibrium, because every player is ε-best-reacting to one of the values (k − 1)ε or kε, whereas the real aggregated value is in the segment [(k − 1)ε, (k + 1)ε], and so by Lemma 1 every player is (4λε + λ/n + ε)-best replying.
Formally, consider a time t 0 such that µ(a(t 0 )) ∈ l k . Let U N S := {i : a i = b i (kε) and a i = b i ((k − 1)ε)} be the set of players who were chosen to update their action neither in σ k−1 nor in σ k . Denote by ω 1 the event where µ(a(t 0 )) ∈ σ k−1 ∪ σ k for every t ∈ [t 0 , t 0 + 2n ln n + 2n]. By inequality (7) P BR(ε) (ω 1 ) ≥ (1 − e −Ω(n) ) 2nlogn+2n = 1 − e −Ω(n) .
Denote by ω 2 the event where every player i ∈ U N S is chosen to update his action during the period of time [t 0 , t 0 + 2n ln n]. By the classical Coupon Collector's problem the expected time for sampling all the players in U N S is at most 19 n ln n. Therefore, by Markov inequality,
Combining inequalities (8) and (9) we get P BR(ε) (ω 1 ∩ ω 2 ) ≥ P BR(ε) (ω 1 ) + P BR(ε) (ω 2 ) − 1 ≥ 1/2 − e −Ω(n) .
Note that by the above-mentioned arguments, if ω 1 ∩ ω 2 happens, then BR(ε) reaches P N E 4λε+λ/n+ε , and P N E 4λε+λ/n+ε ⊂ P N E (5λ+1)ε for n small enough. Moreover, if ω 1 ∩ω 2 happens, then BR(ε) reaches P N E (5λ+1)ε ∩(L k ∪EQ) (this is because at the segment of time [t 0 +n ln n, t 0 +n ln n+2n] the dynamic BR(ε) does not leave the set P N E (5λ+1)ε and it must visit L k ∪ EQ at least once). Denote by T 1 := T BR(ε) (P N E (5λ+1)ε ∪ (L * ∩ EQ) the maximal expected time for reaching P N E (5λ+1)ε ∪ (L * ∩ EQ) from any initial state. Denote by T 2 := T BR(ε) (L k P N E (5λ+1)ε ∪ (L * ∩ EQ)) the maximal expected time for reaching P N E (5λ+1)ε ∪ (L * ∩ EQ) from any initial state a 0 ∈ L k . Then by Corollary 1 we have
By inequalities (8) and (10) we have
By substituting this inequality in (11) we get
The proof of Theorem 2 is based only on an expected-arrival-time analysis.
We will use the following simple lemma on Markov chains, which follows directly from Gorodeisky [11] , Proposition A.5:
Lemma 7 (Gorodeisky [11] ). Let M be a Markov chain over S, and let S 1 ⊂ S 2 ⊂ S be two subsets such that T M (S 1 ) ≤ g 1 and T M (S 1 S\S 2 ) ≥ g 2 . Then µ(S 2 ) ≥ g2 g1+g2 for every invariant distribution µ of M . 19 In the classical Coupon Collector problem the players are sampled with replacement. In our scenario players are sampled according to a different role. But the essential argument for the n ln n bound is that players in the set U N S that has not been sampled yet can be chosen in every period.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let S 1 = P N E (5λ+1)ε ∩ (L * ∪ EQ) and let S 2 = ∪ k:l k ∈l * {a : µ(a) ∈ σ k−1 ∪σ k and a i ∈ {b i ((k−1)ε), b i (kε)} for every i}∪EQ.
Note that S 2 ⊂ P N E (5λ+1)ε , because every player is best-reacting to an aggregation that is close to the real one (this argument was explained in the proof of Theorem 1). Once BR(ε) reaches S 1 we know by inequality (7) that the expected time of leaving the segments σ k−1 , σ k is at least e −Ω(n) , and as long as the aggregation stays in σ k−1 ∪ σ k only action profiles from S 2 will be played. Therefore we get T BR(ε) (S 1 S\S 2 ) ≥ e Ω(n) , while T BR(ε) (S 1 ) ≤ O(n log n) (by Theorem 1). Therefore µ(P N E (5λ+1)ε ) ≥ µ(S 2 ) ≥ e Ω(n)
